Arguing against the validity of reason - D'Souza - Kant

[Lotus]

D'Souza is a terrible Kantian.

Kant's arguments very subtly explored the strengths of the use of reason in experience as well as the limits of reason in experience. Kant placed a limit on reason in recognizing that we cannot know the Ding An Sich, the "thing-in-itself," through reason. This is because reason approaches objects only as they are mediated by our senses. That is, right now I am not experiencing my coffee table, I am only experiencing my psycho-sensual perception of my coffee table. Therefore any reason which I apply to the coffee table, such as "The table is strong enough to hold up my cup of tea," is reason as mediated, not reason applied directly to the object itself.

This argument has led Kant to be deeply influential in today's world. Not only has Kant's theory of epistemology (how we know stuff) spawned important philosophical movements such as phenomenology (as typified by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) and deconstruction (as typified by Derrida, De Certeau, etc.), his theory of knowledge is a baseline for method in many other disciplines. In psychology Jung taught that we only know our representations of reality, not reality itself, and psychotherapy of all stripes would be impossible if things were otherwise. In history we find Foucault, in anthropology Michael Jackson, in sociology Alfred Schutz, and this list goes on. This paragraph is just a minor sampling of the major effects of Kant's theory of reason and knowledge.

Kant's theory has been so influential because his argument was very subtle and precise. Although Kant did temper the Enlightenment's overblown reliance on reason, Kant did not in the end conclude that reason was worthless. Kant said that reason was worthwhile as long as its limits were respected. As well, Kant and later Kantians talk about the consensual nature of knowledge. That is, your reason and my reason may be limited, but by joining forces we can make reliable statements about the world which we consensually perceive. In other words, the pitch is real because pitcher, batter, other players, and fans perceive it that way, although each individual may perceive the reality of the pitch slightly differently.

D'Souza illicitly exploits Kant with his attack on reason. Again, Kant was never willing to make the philosophic move that reason is bankrupt, as his argument was more subtle. And Kant certainly was not willing to say, "Hey, reason is mediated, therefore we all need to be Christian." Kant would tell D'Souza that his faith in the Bible and in Jesus is just as mediated, just as limited, as reason is. That is, in the Kantian critique, there is not one Bible and one Jesus. Instead, there is the Bible as you read and understand it, and Jesus as you perceive and understand him. My perceptions may be different. If D'Souza were less partisan and coarse in his application of Kant, he would argue the opposite of what he normally argues. That is, if he were a faithful Kantian D'Souza would argue that we each have our own religious (and political) paths, and we each must navigate our own ways without having D'Souza tell us what to think.

[RedskinRat]

Originally Posted by Lotus

Therefore any reason which I apply to the coffee table, such as "The table is strong enough to hold up my cup of tea," is reason as mediated, not reason applied directly to the object itself.

Using a coffee table for tea? Heresy!

A finely crafted response apart from that small point.

[Lotus]

Originally Posted by RedskinRat

Using a coffee table for tea? Heresy!

A finely crafted response apart from that small point.

Here in the deep south iced tea is a way of life.

[JoeRedskin]

Originally Posted by Lotus

D'Souza is a terrible Kantian.

Kant's arguments very subtly explored the strengths of the use of reason in experience as well as the limits of reason in experience. Kant placed a limit on reason in recognizing that we cannot know the Ding An Sich, the "thing-in-itself," through reason. This is because reason approaches objects only as they are mediated by our senses. That is, right now I am not experiencing my coffee table, I am only experiencing my psycho-sensual perception of my coffee table. Therefore any reason which I apply to the coffee table, such as "The table is strong enough to hold up my cup of tea," is reason as mediated, not reason applied directly to the object itself.

This argument has led Kant to be deeply influential in today's world. Not only has Kant's theory of epistemology (how we know stuff) spawned important philosophical movements such as phenomenology (as typified by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) and deconstruction (as typified by Derrida, De Certeau, etc.), his theory of knowledge is a baseline for method in many other disciplines. In psychology Jung taught that we only know our representations of reality, not reality itself, and psychotherapy of all stripes would be impossible if things were otherwise. In history we find Foucault, in anthropology Michael Jackson, in sociology Alfred Schutz, and this list goes on. This paragraph is just a minor sampling of the major effects of Kant's theory of reason and knowledge.

Kant's theory has been so influential because his argument was very subtle and precise. Although Kant did temper the Enlightenment's overblown reliance on reason, Kant did not in the end conclude that reason was worthless. Kant said that reason was worthwhile as long as its limits were respected. As well, Kant and later Kantians talk about the consensual nature of knowledge. That is, your reason and my reason may be limited, but by joining forces we can make reliable statements about the world which we consensually perceive. In other words, the pitch is real because pitcher, batter, other players, and fans perceive it that way, although each individual may perceive the reality of the pitch slightly differently.

D'Souza illicitly exploits Kant with his attack on reason. Again, Kant was never willing to make the philosophic move that reason is bankrupt, as his argument was more subtle. And Kant certainly was not willing to say, "Hey, reason is mediated, therefore we all need to be Christian." Kant would tell D'Souza that his faith in the Bible and in Jesus is just as mediated, just as limited, as reason is. That is, in the Kantian critique, there is not one Bible and one Jesus. Instead, there is the Bible as you read and understand it, and Jesus as you perceive and understand him. My perceptions may be different. If D'Souza were less partisan and coarse in his application of Kant, he would argue the opposite of what he normally argues. That is, if he were a faithful Kantian D'Souza would argue that we each have our own religious (and political) paths, and we each must navigate our own ways without having D'Souza tell us what to think.

I need to read me some Kant.

[JoeRedskin]

Originally Posted by Lotus

This is because reason approaches objects only as they are mediated by our senses. That is, right now I am not experiencing my coffee table, I am only experiencing my psycho-sensual perception of my coffee table. Therefore any reason which I apply to the coffee table, such as "The table is strong enough to hold up my cup of tea," is reason as mediated, not reason applied directly to the object itself.

Sorry, I don't understand the distinction. I get "reason mediated through our perceptions" but how would one apply reason directly to an object?

[Lotus]

Originally Posted by JoeRedskin

I need to read me some Kant.

You might try Kant's Critique of Pure Reason for this argument.

Originally Posted by JoeRedskin

Sorry, I don't understand the distinction. I get "reason mediated through our perceptions" but how would one apply reason directly to an object?

Try two different claims:
1) The coffee table is strong enough to hold my cup of tea
2) The coffee table, as I perceive it, is strong enough to hold my cup of tea

Please note that the second claim is softer. It does not imply that my reasoning abilities are as direct, objective, and solid as the first claim does.

Note that either way I'm going to put my cup on the table. Or, returning to the baseball scenario, either way the batter is going to hit the baseball he perceives. But with the second claim the faculty of reason is more limited in terms of scope.

Here we can understand that Kant did not deny reason completely. He just wanted to soften its claims on reality.

Does this make sense?

[JoeRedskin]

Originally Posted by Lotus

Try two different claims:
1) The coffee table is strong enough to hold my cup of tea
2) The coffee table, as I perceive it, is strong enough to hold my cup of tea

Please note that the second claim is softer. It does not imply that my reasoning abilities are as direct, objective, and solid as the first claim does.

Note that either way I'm going to put my cup on the table. Or, returning to the baseball scenario, either way the batter is going to hit the baseball he perceives. But with the second claim the faculty of reason is more limited in terms of scope.

Here we can understand that Kant did not deny reason completely. He just wanted to soften its claims on reality.

Does this make sense?

Yes. I think. In the first example, the statement is made as an assertion of truth about the table's attributes - in of itself, by itself and without any perception by me needed, it is a truth that the table is strong enough to hold your cup of tea. In the second, you make no assertion as to the table's innate characteristics; rather, you simply state your perception of the table's attributes.

[saden1]

Kant's critique is not criticism (unlike D'Souza) but critical analyses of reason. Kant is not attacking pure reason except to show its limitations. Above all else he hopes to show its possibility and to exult it above impure knowledge which comes to us through distorted sensory channel. Thus pure reason is to mean knowledge that does not come to us through our senses but is independent of all sense experience. Knowledge belonging to us by inherent nature and structure of the mind.

This explains his take quite well:

In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. “Thus,” Kant says, “I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Bxxx). Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know (theoretically) that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. But there are especially strong moral grounds for the belief in human freedom, which acts as “the keystone” supporting other morally grounded beliefs (5:3–4). In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. It thus turns out that two kinds of metaphysics are possible: the metaphysics of experience (or nature) and the metaphysics of morals, both of which depend on Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy.

BTW, don't try to read Critique of Pure Reason by Kant himself...that's shit damn near impossible to read.